The Rehnquist Court and the New Establishment Clause by Mortyn, Russell M.
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 19
Number 2 Winter 1992 Article 7
1-1-1992
The Rehnquist Court and the New Establishment
Clause
Russell M. Mortyn
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Russell M. Mortyn, The Rehnquist Court and the New Establishment Clause, 19 Hastings Const. L.Q. 567 (1992).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol19/iss2/7
The Rehnquist Court and the New
Establishment Clause
By RUSSELL M. MORTYN*
The prescriptions in favor of liberty ought to be leveled against
that quarter where the greatest danger lies, namely, that which
possesses the highest prerogative of power. But this is not found in
either the Executive or Legislative departments of government but
in the body of the people, operating by the majority against the
minority ....
James Madison
Introduction
When Chief Justice William Rehnquist was nominated to the
Supreme Court, he told the members of the Senate Judiciary Committee
that the standard by which they ought to measure a nominee is "fidelity
to the Constitution and let the chips fall where they may .... "2 Rehn-
quist repeatedly referred to the original intent of the Framers as a gauge
by which to measure a judge's "fidelity to the Constitution."3 Rehnquist
believes that the Framers intended to leave value judgments to the Legis-
lature. 4 Thus, Rehnquist firmly stated his view that judges should not
read their own personal values into the Constitution:
I subscribe unreservedly to that philosophy, that when you put on
the robe, you are not there to enforce your own notions as to what
is desirable public policy. You are there to construe as objectively
as you possibly can the Constitution of the United States, the stat-
utes of Congress, and whatever relevant legal materials there may
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A., University of California, Santa Cruz, 1986. The
author thanks Professor Robert S. Alley of the University of Richmond for his generous
assistance.
1. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 437 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789), quoted in William J. Brennan Jr.,
The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEx. L. Rav. 433, 437
(1986).
2. Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 156 (1971) [hereinafter Nomination
Hearings].
3. See, e.g., id. at 18-19, 55, 81-82, 138, 167-69.
4. Id. at 82; see also William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx.
L. REv. 693 (1976).
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be in the case before you.5
Despite his proclamations, both Rehnquist and the Court under his
leadership are frequently criticized as "activist." 6 Some scholars suggest
that Rehnquist uses "original intent," particularly in his interpretation of
the Establishment Clause 7 as a "false god" to justify his personal polit-
ical agenda.' The Rehnquist Court has the opportunity to answer its
critics with its forthcoming decision in Lee v. Weisman.9
Weisman, a school prayer case, presents the Court with the current
legal debate over the meaning of the Establishment Clause. Commenta-
tors generally classify the competing positions of this debate as "ac-
comodationist" and "separationist."' 10 Accomodationists argue that the
Establishment Clause allows some government support of religion,"
while separationists maintain that the Establishment Clause prohibits
any government aid to religion. 2 Since the Court first interpreted the
Establishment Clause forty-five years ago in Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion, 3 it has maintained a separationist viewpoint.' 4 Lee v. Weisman
challenges this longstanding separationist perspective.'
The Court's separationist interpretation of the Establishment Clause
is largely understood to require a secular state. 6 As a result, opponents
5. Nomination Hearings, supra note 2, at 156.
6. See, e.g., DONALD E. BOLES, MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, JUDICIAL AcTrvIsT (1987);
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 101-28 (1990); Owen Fiss & Charles
Krauthammer, A Return to the Antebellum Constitution: The Rehnquist Court, NEW REPUB-
LiC, Mar. 10, 1982, at 14; The Loud Majority, ECONOMIST, July 6, 1991, at 15.
7. The Establishment Clause mandates that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion.... ." U.S. CONT. amend. I.
8. William P. Marshall, Unprecedential Analysis and Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 925 (1986) (citing Philip B. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Consti-
tution, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 839 (1986); Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to
Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 875 (1986)).
9. No. 90-1014 (U.S. argued Nov. 6, 1991).
10. See, e.g., RICHARD E. MORGAN, THE POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICT: CHURCH
AND STATE IN AMERICA 49-68 (2d ed. 1980); Robert L. Cord & Howard Ball, The Separation
of Church and State: A Debate, 1987 UTAH L. REv. 895, 920.
11. DEREK DAVIS, ORIGINAL INTENT 48-49 (1991).
12. Id. at 48.
13. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
14. ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND
CURRENT FICTION at xiii (1982).
15. See Brief for the Petitioners at 14-35, Lee v. Weisman, No. 90-1014 (U.S. argued Nov.
6, 1991) (arguing for coercion as a required element of an Establishment Clause violation);
Respondent's Brief at 8, Weisman, No. 90-1014 ("Petitioners... have seized upon this case as
a vehicle to ask the Court to overturn more than four decades of well-settled law ....
[P]etitioners' attack is focused more on this Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence than
[on] the decision below."); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners passim, Weisman, No. 90-1014 (asking the Court to overturn Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971), the distillation of the Court's separationist jurisprudence).
16. See Steven D. Smith, Separation and the "Secular"." Reconstructing the Disestablish-
ment Decision, 67 TEx. L. REv. 955, 979-80 (19S9). Professor Smith provides an extensive
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of a secular state reject separationism in favor of accomodationism.17 As
Chief Justice Rehnquist has criticized the Court's separationist jurispru-
dence in favor of a more accomodationist stance, he has come to be
viewed as the "champion of religion." '18
Professor Steven Smith describes the coalition of interests repre-
sented by the separationist view: "One group, typically composed of lib-
erals, secularists, and members of vulnerable religious groups, argues
that religious involvement in government is bad for society. The other,
composed of traditional Lutherans and evangelical Protestants, argues
that religious involvement in government is bad for religion." 9
Chief Justice Rehnquist has been instrumental in prodding the
Court away from its traditional separationist stance, toward a more ac-
comodationist interpretation of the Establishment Clause.20 The Weis-
man case implicates the judicial philosophy that Rehnquist espoused in
his Senate nomination hearings.21
historical analysis of the traditions and thought that led to the Establishment Clause. He
contends that the secularist construction is wrong. Id.passim. He maintains that the Framers
of the Establishment Clause derived a narrow concept of separationism from John Locke. Id.
at 959-71. Under this conception, "government was not to pursue spiritual ends. But insofar
as religious belief or practice affected civil interests, religion fell within the domain of proper
governmental concerns." Id. at 970 (footnotes omitted).
17. Id. at 980.
18. DAvis, supra note 11, at 127. Mr. Davis identifies "[p]rivate school and Christian
school advocates" in particular, as holding this view. Id. at 128 n.68.
He asserts, however, that the perception of Rehnquist as the "champion of religion" is ill-
conceived. Id. He argues that Rehnquist is an accomodationist "only to the extent that the
various legislatures choose to exercise their prerogative to accomodate religion." Id. at 127.
Further, Davis suggests that Rehnquist's "nonpreferentialist" interpretation of the Estab-
lishment Clause (discussed infra Part III) is "more reasoned than principled." Id. at 93. Da-
vis presents a compelling argument that Rehnquist is using the nonpreferentialist position as a
substitute for his more sincerely held view that the First Amendment was not intended to
govern the states. Id. at 91-94. According to Davis, since it is no longer feasible to overturn
the "incorporation" of the First Amendment to the states, Rehnquist "is likely to be more
successful by arguing for an application to the states of the same kinds of restrictions on reli-
gion that [Rehnquist argues] were contemplated by the [F]ramers with respect to the national
government." Id. at 93.
19. Smith, supra note 16, at 988 n.175 (citing Michael E. Smith, Religious Activism: The
Historical Record, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1087, 1093 (1986)). The religious objections to
establishment are reflected in the questions of one commentator:
What is the result of all this display of holy things in public places? Does it make the
market-place more holy? Does it improve people? Does it change their character or
motives? On the contrary, the sacred symbols are thereby cheapened and degraded.
The effect is often that of a television commercial on a captive audience-boredom
and resentment.
Dean M. Kelley, Beyond Separation of Church and State, 5 J. CHURCH & STATE 181, 190-91
(1963).
20. See infra Parts II and III.
21. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
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This Note traces Rehnquist's interpretation of the Establishment
Clause. Part I of the Note describes the background of the Court's sepa-
rationist jurisprudence. Part II reviews Rehnquist's opinions prior to the
pivotal Wallace v. Jaffree2 2 case. Part III describes the accomodationist
position that Justice Rehnquist articulated in Jaffree.23 Part IV presents
some criticism of this position. Part V examines the rise of an alternative
interpretation of the Establishment Clause, proposed by Justice
O'Connor, which articulates an intermediate position between the ac-
comodationist and separationist views. Part VI outlines the arguments
before the Court in Lee v. Weisman. This Note concludes that the Court
should adopt Justice O'Connor's position as a workable compromise, and
apply this interpretation to the Weisman case.
I. Background
A. Everson v. Board of Education
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment mandates that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
.... "24 The Court first addressed the meaning of this language in Ever-
son v. Board of Education,25 which upheld a school district's use of tax
revenues to reimburse parents for bus fares used to transport their chil-
dren to parochial schools.
Justice Hugo Black wrote the opinion of the Court. Black began his
Establishment Clause analysis by reviewing the historical environment in
which the First Amendment was written.26 He described the strife and
persecution that prevailed in the colonies:
The very charters granted by the English Crown... authorized...
religious establishments which all, whether believers or non-believ-
ers, would be required to support and attend.... Catholics found
themselves hounded and proscribed because of their faith; Quakers
who followed their conscience went to jail; Baptists were particu-
larly obnoxious to certain dominant Protestant sects; men and wo-
men of varied faiths who happened to be in a minority in a
particular locality were persecuted because they steadfastly per-
sisted in worshipping God only as their own consciences dictated.
And all of these dissenters were compelled to pay tithes and taxes
to support government-sponsored churches whose ministers
preached inflammatory sermons designed to strengthen and con-
solidate the established faith by generating a burning hatred
against dissenters.27
22. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
23. Id. at 91-114 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
25. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
26. Id. at 8.
27. Id. at 9-10 (citations omitted).
Black ascribed the Establishment Clause to the colonials' abhorrence of
these practices.28
Justice Black cited Virginia as "a great stimulus and able leader[ ]"
in the movement toward religious liberty.2 9 In particular, he cited Vir-
ginia's struggle in 1785 and 1786, when the Virginia legislature was set to
renew a tax levy for the established church.3" James Madison's Memo-
rial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments was instrumental in
defeating the proposed tax.31 Not only did the Remonstrance succeed in
defeating the tax levy, but it also induced the Virginia legislature to pass
the "Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom," which was written by
Thomas Jefferson. 2
28. Ma at 11.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id at 12. The Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments is repro-
duced in JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 55 (Robert Alley ed., 1985), and as an
appendix to Everson, 330 U.S. at 63-72. It is hereinafter referred to as the Remonstrance.
The Remonstrance presented 15 distinct and cumulative arguments against the tax. Pro-
fessor Van Patten paraphrases Madison's arguments as follows:
1. Religion is outside the jurisdiction of civil society.
2. There is no legislative power with respect to the retained rights of the people.
3. Even the smallest infringement of religious liberty poses a danger.
4. The bill violates the principle of equality.
5. The civil magistrate is not competent to judge religious truth.
6. Establishment of religion is contrary to the principles of Christianity.
7. The experience of establishment has been disastrous.
8. Establishment is not necessary for the support of Civil Society.
9. Establishment departs from America's image as an asylum from religious op-
pression.
10. The bill would encourage emigration.
11. Establishment destroys political moderation.
12. Establishment is counterproductive to the spread of Christian religion.
13. Establishment of religion will weaken respect for the law.
14. It is not clear that the assessment bill is favored by a majority.
15. The assessment bill is violative of the Virginia Declaration of Rights.
Jonathan K. Van Patten, In the End is the Beginning: An Inquiry into the Meaning of the
Religion Clauses, 27 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1, 51-59 (1983).
Madison stated that "[t]he Religion... of every man must be left to the conviction and
conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate."
Remonstrance, supra, reprinted in Everson, 330 U.S. at 64 app. The proposed tax would "de-
grade[ ] from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions in Religion do not bend to
those of the Legislative authority." Id, reprinted in 330 U.S. at 69. Furthermore, Madison's
objections were based upon principle. "[Tihe same authority which can force a citizen to
contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment[ ] may
force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever.... ." Id., reprinted in
330 U.S. at 65-66. The role of the Remonstrance in leading to the First Amendment is dis-
cussed infra Part IV.B.2.
32. Everson, 330 U.S. at 12 (Everson refers to this bill as the "Virginia Bill for Religious
Liberty"). The bill is reproduced as an appendix to DAVIS, supra note 11, at 171. The role of
the bill in leading to the First Amendment is discussed infra Part IV.B.2.
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The preamble to Jefferson's bill states that "to compel a man to fur-
nish contributions of money for the propogation of opinions which he
disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical ... ,33 The body of the statute man-
dates that "no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any reli-
gious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced,
restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall other-
wise suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief.. . ,,a4 Black
cited previous Supreme Court decisions for the proposition that the First
Amendment was intended to afford the same protections as the Virginia
statute.
35
Black concluded that the bus fare reimbursement program was reli-
gion-neutral, and did not constitute "support" for the parochial
schools. 36 Therefore, the program was constitutional.37 Nevertheless,
Everson set forth this separationist interpretation of the Establishment
Clause: "Neither a state nor the Federal Government... can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. ' 38
B. Lemon v. Kurtzman
Twenty-four years later, then-Chief Justice Burger articulated what
is now the established framework for Establishment Clause analysis. In
Lemon v. Kurtzman,39 the Court examined two state statutes that pro-
vided funds for church-affiliated schools, but prohibited the use of those
funds for religious instruction. The Court held both statutes to be
unconstitutional.'
Lemon fashioned a three-part test to determine whether a statute
violates the Establishment Clause: (1) the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; (2) the statute must not have the primary effect of
advancing or inhibiting religion; and (3) the statute must not foster ex-
cessive governmental entanglement with religion.41
This test was "gleaned" from the Court's earlier decisions.42 The
Court took the "purpose" and "effect" prongs of the test from Board of
33. Everson, 330 U.S. at 13 (quoting the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty).
34. Id. (citing 12 WILLIAM HENING, STATUTES OF VIRGINIA 84 (1823)).
35. 330 U.S. at 13. But see Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 98-99 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Everson attributed too much significance to this statute); infra Part
Ill.
36. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 15.
39. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
40. Id. at 607.
41. Id. at 612-13.
42. Id. at 612.
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Education v. Allen,"3 and the "entanglement" prong from Walz v. Tax
Commission.' Allen derived the "purpose" and "effect" analyses from
Everson.45 Walz formulated the "entanglement" inquiry from a broad
historical survey of the relationship between taxation and religious prop-
erty.46 Thus, the Lemon test is a distillation of the Court's separationist
jurisprudence.
H. Rehnquist's Formative Decisions
Rehnquist indicated early in his tenure that he was dissatisfied with
the Lemon test. When Justice Powell wrote for the majority in Hunt v.
McNair,4 7 he described the three prongs of Lemon as "no more than
helpful signposts." Rehnquist joined in this opinion.
Ten years later, Rehnquist wrote for the Court in Mueller v. Allen.4
Mueller held that a state statute that allowed tax deductions for expenses
incurred in sending children to parochial schools did not violate the Es-
tablishment Clause. Although Rehnquist applied the Lemon test, he
called its precedential value into question.4 9 Citing Hunt, he referred to
Lemon as "no more than a helpful signpost."50 Rehnquist ultimately
applied the Lemon factors in Mueller, but he treated them as conve-
niences, rather than as the constitutional requirements that they had
been for the past decade."1
A week after Mueller, the Court decided an Establishment Clause
case, Marsh v. Chambers,52 without using the Lemon test. 3 Marsh up-
held the constitutionality of prayers at legislative sessions. Chief Justice
43. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). Allen upheld a New York statute that required public schools to
lend textbooks to parochial schools free of charge. Black dissented, arguing that the New
York law was a "stride in [the] direction" of an established state religion. Id at 251 (Black, J.,
dissenting). "[I]t nearly always is by insidious approaches that the citadels of liberty are most
successfully attacked." Id at 251-52 (Black, J., dissenting).
Although the majority purported to follow Everson, Black distinguished the loan of text-
books from the transportation fees upheld in Everson. In Black's view, the textbooks more
directly aided the "propagation of sectarian religious viewpoints." Id at 253 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
44. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). Burger wrote for the Court in Walz, holding that property tax
exemptions for religious organizations did not violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 680.
45. Allen, 392 U.S. at 243.
46. Walz, 397 U.S. at 671-74.
47. 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
48. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
49. See Robert L. Cord, Church-State Separation: Restoring the "No Preference" Doctrine
of the First Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 129, 164-65 (1986) (referring to Rehn-
quist's characterization of Lemon as a "status reduction").
50. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 394.
51. See, eg., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 123 (1982); Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981); WolIman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977); Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772-73 (1973).
52. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
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Burger, the author of the Lemon decision, also wrote for the majority in
Marsh. In holding the contemporary prayers constitutional, he pur-
ported to extrapolate the intent of the Framers from their actions.54
Marsh did not apply the Lemon factors because of the "unique history"
surrounding legislative prayers." The members of the First Congress
voted to appoint and pay a chaplain for each House the same week they
approved the draft of the First Amendment that was submitted to the
states.5 6 Rehnquist joined in Burger's opinion.
III. Rehnquist's Nonpreferentialist Position
Rehnquist most forcefully expressed his antipathy toward the
Lemon test in his dissent to Wallace v. Jaffree.57 Jaffree struck down an
Alabama statute which authorized a daily period of silence in public
schools for "meditation or voluntary prayer."58
Whereas Justice Black, in Everson, had read the Establishment
Clause as prohibiting any government aid to religion, 9 Rehnquist as-
serted that the Establishment Clause prohibited only a national church
and a governmental preference for one religious denomination or sect
over another."° Under the Rehnquist view, the government is not pro-
hibited from aiding religion in general.
Rehnquist asserted that Everson was erroneous as a matter of his-
tory.6 Under Rehnquist's analysis,62 the "wall" metaphor, which epito-
mizes the separationist position, attaches too much significance to
Thomas Jefferson's views on church-state relations.63 Rehnquist sug-
gested that Jefferson's views should be discounted because Jefferson was
out of the country when the Bill of Rights was passed by Congress and
53. Lemon's survival after Marsh was probably due in large part to Justice Brennan's
dissent. Brennan portrayed the holding in Marsh as an aberration. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Professor Cord characterizes Brennan's dissent as a "masterful dis-
play of damage control." Cord, supra note 49, at 166.
54. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790.
55. Id. at 790-91.
56. Id at 790.
57. 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 61.
59. See supra Part I.A; "Neither a state nor the Federal Government... can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another." Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (emphasis added).
60. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
61. Id at 91-107.
62. Id. at 92.
63. The metaphor was first phrased by Jefferson in an 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptist
Association. Jefferson stated: "I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole
American people which declared that their legislature should 'make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separa-
tion between church and State." Id. at 92 (quoting 8 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSoN 113
(H. Washington ed., 1861)).
ratified by the states.
On the other hand, Rehnquist recognized that James Madison
played "as large a part as anyone in the drafting of the Bill of Rights."65
According to Rehnquist, Madison "saw the [First] Amendment as
designed to prohibit the establishment of a national religion, and perhaps
to prevent discrimination among sects. He did not see it as requiring
neutrality on the part of government between religion and irreligion."66
Based upon this reading of history, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the
Establishment Clause, as understood by the Framers, was "not con-
cerned about whether the Government might aid all religions evenhand-
edly."67  This interpretation has come to be termed the
"nonpreferentialist" view.68
Rehnquist limited his historical analysis to an examination of the
proceedings of the First Congress.69 The records of these proceedings,
however, are sparse. The House and Senate originally adopted different
versions of the Religion Amendment.'0 There is a brief record of the
House debates, but the Senate debates were kept secret.71 The language
that was finally adopted as a part of the First Amendment emerged from
a House conference committee.7 2 Debate on the compromise version was
negligible.73
Rehnquist concluded, on the basis of the House proceedings, that
Madison "was undoubtedly the most important architect among the
Members of the House" of the Establishment Clause.74 Rehnquist ar-
gued, however, that Madison spoke "as an advocate of... legislative
compromise, not as an advocate of incorporating the Virginia Statute of
Religious Liberty into the United States Constitution."7 "
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. IdL at 98.
67. Id at 99. Commentators are divided along the same lines as Black and Rehnquist.
For authority supporting Rehnquist's position as to the Framers' intent, see CORD, supra note
14, at ii, 5-15; MICHAEL J. MALBiN, RELIGION AND POLrTICs: THE INTENTIONS OF THE
AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 9 (1978); RODNEY K. SMITH, PUBLIC PRAYER AND
THE CONSTITUTION 73-105 (1987); Cord, supra note 49. For authority refuting this position,
see LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 91-119 (1986); LEONARD W. LEVY, No Establishment of Religion: The Original Under-
standing, in JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 169, 170-79
(1972); Laycock, supra note 8; THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND
STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 207-10 (1986).
68. See, eg., DAVIS, supra note 11, at 48; Smith, supra note 16, at 981 n.136.
69. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 92-98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 97.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id at 93-97.
74. Id at 97-98.
75. Id at 98.
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Madison originally submitted this language to the House: "The
civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or
worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full
and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, in-
fringed."7 6  This language was then referred to a Select Committee,
which consisted of Madison and ten others.7 The Committee revised the
language to read: "[N]o religion shall be established by law, nor shall the
equal rights of conscience be infringed."7 "
Madison spoke to the House in support of the revised language, say-
ing that it meant "that Congress should not establish a religion, and en-
force the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God
in any manner contrary to their conscience."71 9
Representative Benjamin Huntington objected that the language
might be taken to be "hurtful to the cause of religion." 0 Madison re-
sponded that the insertion of the word "national" before the word "reli-
gion" would remedy this objection."1
In support of his assertion that Madison did not intend a "wall of
separation" between church and state, Rehnquist relied on Madison's
originally proposed language, his explanation to the House of its mean-
ing, and his response to Representative Huntington.82
Rehnquist condemned the Lemon test on the basis of this historical
analysis. He declared that the "purpose" and "effect" prongs of Lemon
were faulty because they were based upon Everson's allegedly erroneous
history. 3 He added that the "entanglement" prong, which the Lemon
Court gleaned from Walz v. Tax Commission, 4 was limited to Walz's
facts.8 5 Thus, the Lemon test, according to Rehnquist, "has no more
grounding in the history of the First Amendment than does the wall the-
ory upon which it rests."8 6
The other Justices were not convinced, however. The Court utilized
the Lemon test twice in the same year that Jaffree was decided. Both
times, the Court upheld programs which allowed public school teachers
to teach at religious schools.8 7 Rehnquist dissented in both of those
76. Id. at 94 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)).
77. Id. at 95.
78. Id. (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)).
79. Id. (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)).
80. Id. at 96 (quoting I ANNALS OF CONG. 730-31 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 98.
83. Id. at 108.
84. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). See supra text accompanying note 42.
85. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 109 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 110.
87. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373 (1985).
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cases, citing his Jaffree dissent."8
IV. Criticism of the Nonpreferentialist Position
A. "Original Intent" as a Method of Interpreting the Establishment
Clause
When he articulated his nonpreferentialist interpretation of the Es-
tablishment Clause, Chief Justice Rehnquist purported to implement the
original intent of the Framers, as expressed in the text of the First
Amendment and the corresponding legislative history. The Framers' in-
tent, however, reflects the conditions that prevailed at the time of the
drafting of the Bill of Rights.
In contrast to Rehnquist, Justice Brennan views the Constitution as
a "transformative" document.8 9 In his words: "Our Constitution was
not intended to preserve a preexisting society but to make a new one, to
put in place new principles that the prior political community had not
sufficiently recognized."'9 In Brennan's view, Supreme Court Justices
must "read the Constitution in the only way that [they] can: as twenti-
eth-century Americans. [They must] look to the history of the time of
framing and to the intervening history of interpretation."'"
Brennan vehemently rejects the "original intent" doctrine.92 He ar-
gues that "the Framers themselves did not agree about the application or
meaning of particular constitutional provisions and hid their differences
in cloaks of generality."" a For this reason, the way in which the Framers
intended constitutional principles to apply to specific questions is indis-
cernable.94 Thus, the "original intent" doctrine creates "a presumption
of resolving textual ambiguities against the claim of constitutional
right." 95
Brennan asserts that this presumption "is a choice no less political
than any other [because] it expresses antipathy to claims of the minority
to rights against the majority." 96 He argues that this presumption was
not intended, 97 and that it is inconsistent with the Constitution's
88. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 420-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Ball, 473 U.S. at 400-01
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
89. Brennan, supra note 1, at 438.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 435-38.
93. Id. at 435.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 436.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 438 ("Our Constitution was... intended... to put in place new principles that
the prior political community had not sufficiently recognized.... [The Framers] had no desire
to enshrine the status quo."); see also H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Orig-
inal Intent, 98 HARv. L. REV. 885 (1985). Madison himself expressed his view that "original
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purpose.98
Brennan reiterated in Marsh v. Chambers that "the Constitution is
not a static document whose meaning on every detail is fixed for all time
by the life experience of the Framers."9 9 To support his position, Bren-
nan listed numerous practices that were acceptable in 1789, but that
would be unconstitutional today.1°°
Brennan identified the Establishment Clause as a provision particu-
larly ill-suited to interpretation according to eighteenth-century condi-
tions, because we are now "vastly more diverse" in our religious views
than were the Framers.1 '01 Brennan stated: "'In the face of such
profound changes, practices which may have been objectionable to no
one in the time of Jefferson and Madison may today be highly offensive
to many persons, the deeply devout and the nonbelievers alike.' ,"102
The difference between Rehnquist's method of constitutional inter-
pretation and Brennan's method illustrates the fundamental tension that
is inherent in the Court's role. Rehnquist's "original intent" approach
reflects an overriding concern for principled judicial decisionmaking.' 03
The Framers' intent, as manifested in the text and legislative history of
the Constitution, provides the Court with a standard, independent of it-
self, by which to formulate adjudication. An objective standard restrains
judicial activism, and maintains the Court's perceived legitimacy as the
branch of government that is not accountable to the electorate. 1 4 Such
an objective standard is particularly important in interpreting the Estab-
lishment Clause 05 because its exact meaning is not evident from the
text.
0 6
In contrast, Brennan's view of the Constitution emphasizes the
Court's role as the protector of individual rights against the majoritarian
intent" should not govern constitutional interpretation. See infra note 125 and accompanying
text.
98. Brennan, supra note 1, at 436-37.
99. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 816 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 816-17 n.35 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973) (gender discrimination); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (race dis-
crimination); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 155-58 (1973) (jury trial); Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (cruel and unusual punishment); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967) (search and seizure)).
101. Id. at 817 (quoting School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 347 U.S. 203, 240-41 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring)).
102. Id. (quoting School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 241 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring)).
103. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
104. Brennan also recognizes the desirability of an external constraint on the Justices' per-
sonal predilections. He concedes that such a constraint lends legitimacy to an unaccountable,
counter-majoritarian institution. Brennan, supra note 1, at 435.
105. See generally Van Patten, supra note 31.
106. DAVIS, supra note 11, at xvi.
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political process."°7 In his words, "It is the very purpose of our Constitu-
tion-and particularly of the Bill of Rights-to declare certain values
transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political majorities."' 10 8
Although both methods of constitutional interpretation reflect legiti-
mate concerns, "original intent" is particulary rn-suited to interpretation
of the Establishment Clause for two reasons. The first is the nature of
the right that the Establishment Clause protects-religious liberty." 9 As
Brennan points out, this is a principle which cannot be guaranteed today
if the scope of the Clause's protection is limited by eighteenth-century
conditions. 110 Thus, "original intent" would not protect religious liberty
in today's environment, even if this intent were discernable. The second
reason that Rehnquist's interpretation of the Establishment Clause is in-
adequate is that the "original intent" is not discernable from the limited
legislative history that is available.
B. Rehnquist's Analysis of "Original Intent"
L Thomas Jefferson's Views
In Jaffree, Rehnquist offhandedly dismissed Thomas Jefferson's
views concerning religious freedom because Jefferson was in France
when the First Amendment was adopted.111 But "fidelity to the Consti-
tution"11 2 demands a more thorough examination of Jefferson's influ-
ence. One scholar points out that "even in France Jefferson was closer to
these events than any Supreme Court Justice in the late twentieth cen-
tury can hope to be."11 Brennan's objection to the doctrine of "original
intent" seems particularly applicable to Rehnquist's cursory dismissal of
Jefferson's views: "It is arrogant to pretend that from our vantage we
can gauge accurately the intent of the Framers on application of princi-
107. See Brennan, supra note 1, at 436-37.
Rehnquist also acknowledges this function of the Court: "A mere change in public opin-
ion since the adoption of the Constitution, unaccompanied by a constitutional amendment,
should not change the meaning of the Constitution. A merely temporary majoritarian ground-
swell should not abrogate some individual liberty truly protected by the Constitution." Rehn-
quist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, supra note 4, at 696-97. The Framers "wanted a
Constitution that would check the excesses of majority rule, and they created an institution
[the Supreme Court] to enforce the commands of the Constitution." WILLIAM H. REHN-
QUIr, THE SUPREME COURT 319 (1987).
108. Brennan, supra note 1, at 436.
109. Commentators generally agree that religious liberty is the central purpose of the Es-
tablishment Clause, and that it was intended at least to prevent an established church. Beyond
that, however, they disagree. DAVIs, supra note 11, at 45-46.
110. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 816-17 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also
Brennan, supra note 1, at 437.
111. Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
112. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
113. Leo Pfeffer, Foreword to DAVIS, supra note 11, at xii.
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ple to specific, contemporary questions."'1 14
Brennan is particularly critical of the original intent method when
existing records "provide sparse or ambiguous evidence of the original
intention."11 As there is such a paucity of evidence about the original
intent behind the Establishment Clause, 1 6 a sincere attempt to discern
that original intent should include all the evidence that is available.
Indeed, Jefferson's views on religion differed from those of his con-
temporaries.117 As President, for example, Jefferson refused to issue
Thanksgiving proclamations, believing them to constitute an establish-
ment of religion. 8 Presidents Washington and Adams issued
Thanksgiving proclamations,' 19 and even Madison did so reluctantly."
Nevertheless, as Jefferson was an active participant in public life, his
understanding of the meaning of the Establishment Clause is indicative
of the Clause's original meaning.' His "wall of separation" metaphor
may well indicate the prevailing general public understanding of the Es-
tablishment Clause.' 22 Rehnquist dismissed, as "a short note of cour-
tesy," the letter in which Jefferson's metaphor first appeared. 2
Professor Steven Smith points out, however, that Jefferson's casual use of
the metaphor strengthens, rather than weakens, the likelihood that the
metaphor described what Americans generally understood the Clause to
mean. 1
24
Madison himself thought that the understanding of the people,
rather than that of the Framers, should control the Constitution's inter-
pretation. 2 Thus, if Madison's intended methodology is followed, Jef-
114. Brennan, supra note 1, at 435.
115. Id.
116. See DAvis, supra note 11, at xvi.
117. Smith, supra note 16, at 973 n.100.
118. Laycock, supra note 8, at 914.
119. Id.
120. Id. President Madison issued Thanksgiving proclamations "only in time of war and
at the request of Congress, and his proclamations merely invited citizens so disposed to unite
their prayers on a single day." Id. Madison explained that he "was always careful to make the
Proclamations absolutely indiscriminate, and merely recommendatory ... ." Letter from
James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), reprinted in JAFs MADISON ON RELI-
GIOUS LIBERTY 82-83 (Robert Alley ed., 1985). Madison ultimately concluded that his proc-
lamations had violated the Establishment Clause. Laycock, supra note 8, at 914 (citing Fleet,
Madison's Detached Memoranda, 3 WM. & MARY Q. 535, 558-62 (3d ser. 1946)).
121. Smith, supra note 16, at 974 n.100.
122. Id.
123. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
124. Smith, supra note 16, at 974 n.100; see also DAvis, supra note 11, at 140.
125. DAVIS, supra note 11, at 3 8-39. Regarding the understanding of the people, Madison
stated:
I entirely concur in the propriety of resorting to the sense in which the Constitution
was accepted and ratified by the nation. In that sense alone it is the legitimate Con-
stitution. And if that be not the guide in expounding it, there can be no security for a
consistent and stable, more than for a faithful, exercise of its powers.
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ferson's letter should carry greater evidentiary weight than the legislative
history upon which Rehnquist relied.
2. Madison's Role Outside the House of Representatives
In assessing Madison's "original intent," Rehnquist considered only
the record of the proceedings in the First Congress which lead to the
adoption of the Establishment Clause.' 26 He failed to consider other evi-
dence of Madison's intent.
Most conspicuously, Rehnquist omitted Madison's Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious.Assessments 127 from his analysis. He as-
serted that Everson was "totally incorrect in suggesting that Madison
carried [the views embodied in the Remonstrance] onto the floor of the
United States House of Representatives when he proposed the language
which would ultimately become the Bill of Rights."' 28
Given the role of the Remonstrance in leading to the First Amend-
ment, it is surprising that Rehnquist did not consider it to be relevant
legal authority.'29 One scholar considers the Remonstrance and Jeffer-
son's "Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom" to be "twin instruments
that marked a major turning point in the development of the doctrine of
separation of church and state in the United States.' 130
Of all the states to abolish government support of religion, Virginia
encountered the most dramatic battle.' 3  The Church of England had
been the established church of Virginia from 1631 until 1776.132 In 1776,
Virginia passed a statute that exempted nonmembers of the Church of
England from taxes for the church's support, effectively disestablishing
the church. 33 In 1779, however, a bill for a "general" tax assessment, to
support religion on a nonpreferential basis, was introduced in the Vir-
Quoted in Jonathan K. Van Patten, The Partisan Battle Over the Constitution: Meese's Juris-
prudence of Original Intention and Brennan's Theory of Contemporary Ratification, 70 MARQ.
L. REv. 389, 399 (1987).
In order to prevent interpretation according to "original intent," Madison delayed publi-
cation of his notes of the Constitutional Convention until after his death. DAvis, supra note
11, at 39. Madison stated: "As a guide in expounding and applying the provisions of the
Constitution, the debates and incidental decisions of the Convention can have no authoritative
character." Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie (Sept. 15, 1791), quoted in DAVIs,
supra note 11, at 39.
126. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 91-114 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
127. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
128. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 99 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
129. Compare Rehnquist's rejection of the Remonstrance as an interpretive guide, id. at 98-
99, with the statement at his nomination hearings that a judge should consider "whatever
relevant legal materials there may be" in a case. See supra text accompanying note 5.
130. DAVIS, supra note 11, at 139.
131. Id. at 136.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 137.
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ginia legislature.134 In opposition to this bill,135 Jefferson introduced his
"Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom," which provided, in part,
"that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their
opinions in matters of religion, and that the same shall in no wise dimin-
ish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities."' 136 After extensive debate,
the Virginia legislature did not pass either of the two diametrically op-
posed bills.137
Frustrated with the legislature's failure to support Christianity, Pat-
rick Henry introduced another bill in 1784, which would require a gen-
eral tax assessment to support Christanity.'38 Madison opposed the
general assessment, but a majority of the Virginia legislature supported
it.' 39 Madison voted for a narrower bill, establishing the Episcopal
Church, in order to avert the passage of the general assessment.'4° The
legislature passed this narrower bill, 4 ' and postponed the final vote on
the general assessment until the next session. 142
In between legislative terms, Madison wrote the Remonstrance, op-
posing the general assessment. 43 The Remonstrance, which repeatedly
expressed the concept of separationism, 144 was instrumental in defeating
the proposed assessment, and in inspiring support for Jefferson's bill,
which Madison reintroduced. 14  One scholar labels this battle in the Vir-
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 173.
137. Id. at 137-38.
138. Id. at 138.
139. Id.
140. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 9, 1785), reprinted in JAMES
MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 66-67 (Robert Alley ed., 1985).
141. Id.
142. DAVIS, supra note 11, at 138.
143. Id.
144. The Religion... of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of
every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate. This
right... is unalienable; because the opinions of men, depending only on the evidence
contemplated by their own minds, cannot follow the dictates of other men .... [I]n
matters of Religion, no man's right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society, and
... Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.... [If religion be exempt from
the authority of the Society at large, still less can it be subject to that of the Legisla-
tive Body.... The preservation of a free government requires not merely[ ] that the
metes and bounds which separate each department of power may be invariably main-
tained; but more especially, that neither of them be suffered to oxerleap the great
Barrier which defends the rights of the people.
Remonstrance, supra note 31, reprinted in Everson, 330 U.S. at 64-65.
Throughout the Remonstrance, Madison argues that government has no authority over
matters of conscience. He also makes clear that his objections are based upon principle:
"The same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property
for the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment
.. " Remonstrance, supra note 31, reprinted in Everson, 330 U.S. at 65-66.
145. DAvis, supra note 11, at 138-39.
[Vol. 19:567
THE NEW ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
ginia legislature the "fullest expression" of a separationist "revolu-
tion." ' " By 1789, when Congress ratified the First Amendment, seven
of the original thirteen states had banned government support of any
church or churches.147 Moreover, all six remaining states abolished state
support of religion by 1833.148 Rehnquist offers no satisfactory justifica-
tion for ignoring the history surrounding the First Amendment.149
Rehnquist's assertion that Madison favored nonpreferential aid to
religion is inconsistent, not only with the Remonstrance, but also with
other writings of Madison. For example, Madison wrote a letter to his
father, explaining his vote for the bill that established the Episcopal
Church:
I consider the passage of this Act... as having been so far useful
as to have parried for the present the Gen[eral] Assess[ment]
which would otherwise have certainly been saddled upon us ....
If it be unpopular among the laity it will soon be repealed, and will
be a standing lesson to them of the danger of referring religious
matters to the legislature.150
This letter shows that Madison voted for the establishment of a single
church in order to avert the nonpreferential general assessment. Thus,
the views that motivated Madison's vote in the Virginia legislature are
inconsistent with the views that Rehnquist ascribed to Madison in Wal-
lace v. Jaffree. 51 Professor Robert Alley, Executive Director of the
James Madison Memorial Committee, explains that Madison feared a
nonpreferential establishment of religion in general more than he feared
an establishment of a single religion because a general, nonpreferential
establishment would result in "tyranny of the majority." '52 This consti-
tutes the "danger of referring religious matters to the legislature."'1 53
Madison also described his opposition to nonpreferential aid to reli-
gion in a letter to Thomas Jefferson, in which he further explained his
vote for the Episcopal Church bill:
146. Id. at 139.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
150. Letter from James Madison, Jr. to James Madison, Sr. (Jan. 6, 1785), reprinted in
JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 66 (Robert Alley ed., 1985).
151. 472 U.S. 38, 98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Madison . . .saw the [First]
Amendment as designed to prohibit the establishment of a national religion, and perhaps to
prevent discrimination among sects. He did not see it as requiring neutrality on the part of
government between religion and irreligion."); id. at 99 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (The mem-
bers of the First Congress were "definitely not concerned about whether the Government
might aid all religions evenhandedly.").
152. Telephone interview with Professor Robert S. Alley, Executive Director of the James
Madison Memorial Committee (Aug. 31, 1991).
153. See supra text accompanying note 150.
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[Both] friends and adversaries of the measure ... will probably
concur in a revision if not a repeal of the law .... [T]he law is in
various points of view exceptionable. But... [a] negative of the
bill... would have doubled the eagerness and the pretexts for a
much greater evil, [Patrick Henry's] General Assessment, which
there is good ground to believe was parried by this partial gratifica-
tion of its warmest votaries .... Should [the General Assessment]
ever pass into a law in its present form it may [and] will be easily
eluded. It is chiefly obnoxious on account of its dishonorable prin-
ciple and dangerous tendency.154
The letter demonstrates that Madison considered nonpreferential aid to
religion in general to be "a much greater evil" than the establishment of a
single religion.
A letter to Edward Livingston, in which Madison explained his
Thanksgiving proclamations, demonstrates that Madison shared the con-
cerns of modern religious separationists 155 as well:
Notwithstanding the general progress made within the two last
centuries in favor of this branch of liberty, [and] the full establish-
ment of it, in some parts of our Country, there remains in others a
strong bias towards the old error, that without some sort of alli-
ance or coalition between [government] and [r]eligion neither can
be duly supported. Such indeed is the tendency to such a coalition,
and such is its corrupting influence on both the parties, that the
danger cannot be too carefully guarded [against]. And in a [gov-
ernment] of opinion, like ours, the only effectual guard must be
found in the soundness and stability of the general opinion on the
subject. Every new [and] successful example therefore of a perfect
separation between ecclesiastical and civil matters, is of importance.
And I have no doubt that every new example, will succeed, as
every past one has done, in shewing [sic] that religion & [govern-
ment] will both exist in greater purity, the less they are mixed
together. 15
6
Rehnquist's perception of Madison's "original intent" is incomplete.
Rehnquist looks only at the "glimpses of Madison's thinking [that are]
reflected by [his] actions on the floor of the House in 1789."' 157 Madison
left evidence, in addition to these "glimpses," of his intent. Because
Rehnquist does not consider this evidence, he reaches a conclusion that is
inconsistent with it. A more thorough examination of the evidence yields
a more complete picture of "original intent."
154. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 9, 1785), reprinted in JAMES
MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 66-67 (Robert Alley ed., 1985).
155. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
156. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), reprinted in JAMES
MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 82-83 (Robert Alley ed., 1985) (emphasis added).
157. Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38, 98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
3. The Records of the First Congress
In Jaffree, Rehnquist cited the language that Madison originally
proposed for the Establishment Clause,15 his speech to the House in
support of the Select Committee's revised language," 9 and his response
to Representative Huntington's objection that the Committee's language
might be "hurtful to the cause of religion."'" He used these cites to
contend that Madison did not intend a separationist construction.' 6' It
is possible to reach a conclusion contrary to Rehnquist's, even based
solely upon these records of the First Congress.
The language which Madison originally proposed, as well as the lan-
guage he used in his speech to the House, can be read to prohibit any
state action that infringes upon any "right of conscience," including the
right not to worship.' 62 Madison first proposed this language: "The civil
rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship,
nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal
rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed."'163
The House referred the language to a committee, which revised it to
read: "[N]o religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal
rights of conscience be infringed."'x Madison told the House that he
took the words to mean that Congress "should not establish a religion
... nor compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to their
conscience."' 65 This description supports the view, contrary to Rehn-
quist's interpretation, that the Establishment Clause was intended to
reach any encroachment upon the freedom of conscience, including the
right not to worship at all. 66 Rehnquist himself concedes Madison's
concern that the Necessary and Proper Clause might be used to "infringe
the rights of conscience."' 67
Madison responded to Representative Huntington's objection to the
proposed language by suggesting that the word "national" be added to
the House committee's language, 6 ' amending it to read: "No national
religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal rights of con-
science be infringed." This amended version would have retained the
158. Ia at 94.
159. Id. at 95.
160. Id. at 96.
161. Id. at 98-99; see supra Part III.
162. Michael D. Lieder, Religious Pluralism and Education in Historical Perspective: A Ci-
tique of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
813, 818-19 (1987).
163. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 94 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434
(Joseph Gales ed., 1789)).
164. Id. at 95 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 729 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)).
165. Id. (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)).
166. Lieder, supra note 162, at 818-19 n.30.
167. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 95-96 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 96.
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language pertaining to the "rights of conscience," and thus could also be
read to protect the right not to worship.
Madison then explained this suggestion.1 69 Read in isolation, this
explanation could be read to support Rehnquist's interpretation.1 70
Taken as a whole, however, the legislative history is ambiguous at
best. 1 71 The doctrine of stare decisis dictates that the Lemon test, which
incorporates Justice Black's analysis of the Framers' intent, should re-
main intact.172
169. [Madison] believed that the people feared one sect might obtain a pre-eminence,
or two combine together, and establish a religion to which they would compel others
to conform. He thought that if the word "national" was introduced, it would point
the amendment directly to the object it was intended to prevent.
Id. (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 731 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)).
170. Lieder, supra note 162, at 818-19 n.30.
171. Id. at 818-20.
172. Stare decisis is the doctrine under which the Court abides by decided precedent.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990). Rehnquist stated in Jaffree that "stare deci-
sis may bind courts as to matters of law, but it cannot bind them as to matters of history." 472
U.S. at 99 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). However, Rehnqulst's dissent is directed as much to-
ward Everson's "law" (separationism) as toward its "history." See id. at 91-114.
Rehnquist has also stated his view that precedent may be entitled to less weight in the
field of constitutional law than in other areas. Nomination Hearings, supra note 2, at 19. In
contrast, however, Madison indicated that the Court's precedent should be afforded particular
deference when it interprets the Constitution:
[W]hy are judicial precedents, when formed on due discussion and consideration,
and deliberately sanctioned by reviews and repetitions, regarded as of binding influ-
ence, or rather of authoritative force, in settling the meaning of a law?... [Blecause
... the good of society requires that the rules of conduct ... should be certain and
known ....
Can it be of less consequence that the meaning of a constitution should be fixed
and known than that the meaning of a law should be so? Can, indeed, a law be fixed
in its meaning and operation unless the Constitution be so? On the contrary, if a
particular legislature, differing in the construction of the Constitution from a series of
preceding constructions, proceed to act on that difference, they not only introduce
uncertainty and instability in the Constitution, but in the laws themselves[ ] inas-
much as all laws preceding the new construction and inconsistent with it are not only
annulled for the future, but virtually pronounced nullities from the beginning.
... Has the wisest and most conscientious judge ever scrupled to acquiesce in
decisions, in which he has been overruled by the matured opinions of the majority of
his colleagues, and subsequently to conform himself thereto, as to authoritative expo-
sitions of the law? And is it not reasonable that the same view of the official oath [to
support the Constitution] should be taken by a legislator, acting under the Constitu-
tion, which is his guide, as is taken by a judge, acting under the law, which is his?
There is, in fact and in common understanding, a necessity of regarding a course
of practice, as above characterized, in the light of a legal rule of interpreting a law;
and there is a like necessity of considering it a constitutional rule of interpreting a
constitution.
Letter from James Madison to C.J. Ingersoll (June 25, 1831) (quoted in JOSEPH STORY, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 389 (1891)). Madison's letter
suggests that the Court should not overturn its separationist precedent absent a more compel-
ling demonstration of error than Rehnquist provides.
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C. The "Nonpreferentialist" Position and Religious Minorities
Chief Justice Rehnquist's "nonpreferentialist" interpretation of the
Establishment Clause also raises certain policy concerns. The nonprefer-
entialist view would allow government to aid religion in general. "Non-
preferential" aid to religion is inevitably shaped by the majority view-
usually Christianity.173 "Nonpreferential" aid thus subjects this most
personal of rights to the majoritarian process.174 For example, a Jewish,
Buddhist, or Moslem schoolchild may be faced with a choice between
participating in a Christian religious exercise, thus compromising his or
her beliefs, or withdrawing, thereby calling attention to his or her non-
conformity. 7 ' This choice pressures the schoolchild to conform to the
majoritarian norm.176
Moreover, "nonpreferential" aid to Christianity may offend some
devout Christians.1 77 For example, some Christians have complained
that government Christmas displays, such as creches, detract from the
sacred meaning of the symbols. 7 '
Even if "nonpreferential" aid could be administered without favor-
173. See, eg., Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (Christian club sought pub-
lic school sponsorship); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (city erected Christian nativ-
ity scene); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (state statute required public schools to post
the Ten Commandments in each classroom); Stein v. Plainwell Community Schs., 822 F.2d
1406 (6th Cir. 1987) (public school conducted Christian prayer).
174. See Laycock, supra note 8, at 920; see also Respondent's Brief at 44-47, Lee v. Weis-
man, No. 90-1014 (U.S. argued Nov. 6, 1991) (arguing that the prayer in Weisman pressured
schoolchildren to conform to the majority's notion of acceptable behavior).
175. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 72 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Respondent's Brief at 44-47, Weis-
man, No. 90-1014.
176. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 72 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Respondent's Brief at 44-47, Weis-
man, No. 90-1014.
177. In addition to the objections of minority religions and the nonreligious, there are also
objections, by popular religions, to government involvement in religion. See supra note 19.
The amicus brief filed by the Solicitor General in support of the petitioners in Weisman
implicitly recognizes these objections. The brief cites the Oath Clauses of the Constitution as
evidence that "acknowledgment of religious devotion [is] entirely consistent with the civic
order provided for in that document." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Support-
ing Petitioners at 13, Weisman, No. 90-1014. After giving a thorough description of the reli-
gious significance of the oath, id. at 13-14, the brief addresses the Clauses' provision for
substituting an affirmation for the oath. The brief notes that the provision for affirmation "was
afforded not for the irreligious who might not accept the religious significance of an oath, but
for those whose religious scruples precluded such a solemn invocation for worldly ends." Id.
at 14-15 n.12.
Thus, the Oath Clauses provide for the objections that the religious may have to a general
establishment. In the eyes of the Solicitor General, however, the objections of "the irreligious"
apparently do not warrant such consideration.
178. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 651 n.8 (1989)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 712
n.19 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ing the majority religion, 7 9 and without offending devout Christians,
Rehnquist's position is particularly troubling when applied to the non-
religious. The Census Bureau reports that nine percent of Americans
have "no religious preference." 180 Another study concludes that six per-
cent do not believe in God.'81 A "nonpreferential" establishment would
force these citizens to support religion.8 2 Freedom of conscience, in-
cluding the right of nonbelief, should be protected from the political pro-
cess. The individual's right to choose his or her beliefs should not be
subjugated to the views of the prevailing majority.
Justice O'Connor formulated an interpretation of the Establishment
Clause in Lynch v. Donnelly' 3 that is a compromise between the ac-
comodationist and separationist views. Unlike Rehnquist's interpreta-
tion, O'Connor's "no endorsement" test need not discriminate against
religious minorities or the nonreligious. As demonstrated in County of
Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 8' the "no endorsement"
test can be applied so as to protect the rights of religious minorities and
the nonreligious. 185
V. O'Connor's "No Endorsement" Position
A. Lynch v. Donnelly
The Court's accomodationist stance in Lynch v. Donnelly 186 reflects
Rehnquist's influence. The Lynch Court held that a city's Christmas dis-
play, which included a Christian nativity scene, a Santa Claus house, and
a Christmas tree, did not violate the Establishment Clause. 187
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger discounted the binding
effect of his own opinion in Lemon, referring to two Establishment
179. Mr. Lieder contends that minority religions are protected by the najoritarian political
process. Lieder, supra note 162, at 884-85. He argues that the rise of religious pluralism
allows minority religious groups to protect themselves within the political process through
issue-specific political alliances. Id.
180. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1990, at 55.
181. See Brief of the United States Catholic Conference as Amicus Curiae in Support of the
Petitioners at 14 n.34, Weisman, No. 90-1014 (citing GEORGE GALLUP & JIM CASTELLI, THE
PEOPLE'S RELIGION 4 (1989)).
182. "If the state attempts to support all religions, it compels those who claim no religion
at all-their right in a secular state-to support what they do not believe." DAVIS, supra note
11, at 147-48; see also Norman Dorsen, The Religion Clauses and Nonbelievers, 27 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 863 (1986).
183. 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
184. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
185. See infra Part V.B.
186. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
187. Id. at 687.
Clause cases that did not apply the test. 8' Nevertheless, the majority in
Lynch ultimately used the Lemon test to reach its holding.8 9 The Court
held that the cr~ehe had the legitimate secular purpose of celebrating the
holiday season,190 that any benefit conferred upon religion by the creche
was insignificant, 91 and that the city's use of the cr6eche did not consti-
tute impermissible entanglement. 92
Burger discredited Jefferson's "wall of separation" metaphor as "not
a wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship
that in fact exists between church and state."'193 He went on to state that
the Establishment Clause "affirmatively mandates accomodation... of
all religions . "19 Justice Rehnquist joined in Burger's majority
opinion.
Justice Brennan's separationist dissent stands in sharp contrast.
Brennan argued that the Establishment Clause requires that "the organs
of government remain strictly separate and apart from religious affairs
.... "19 Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined in Brennan's
dissent.
Justice O'Connor provided the deciding vote. In addition to joining
Burger's opinion, she also wrote a concurrence. 96 Her concurring opin-
ion shaped an intermediate position between the accomodationist and
separationist views. 197 Under O'Connor's view, the government would
run afoul of the Establishment Clause if it excessively entangled itself
with religious institutions, or if it endorsed or disapproved of religion. 19
This proposal has come to be termed the "no endorsement" test.' 99
O'Connor's interpretation retains all three prongs of the Lemon test.
Under her view, the entanglement prong "is properly limited to institu-
tional entanglement. ' '2 °" Thus, O'Connor rejected the argument that the
political divisiveness caused by the creche constituted "entanglement"
which would violate the Establishment Clause.201
According to O'Connor, the "purpose" prong asks "whether the
government intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval
188. Id at 679 (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S. 228 (1982)).
189. Id. at 681-85.
190. Id. at 681.
191. Id. at 683.
192. Id. at 684.
193. Id at 673.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 698 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 687-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
197. See id.
198. Id at 687-88.
199. See Smith, supra note 16, at 957.
200. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
201. Id at 689-90.
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of religion. ' 20 2 The "effect" prong asks whether the government's prac-
tice has "the effect of communicating a message of endorsement or disap-
proval of religion."2 "3 "An affirmative answer to either question should
render the challenged practice invalid." 2' O'Connor found that the
creche in question was not intended to endorse, and did not have the
effect of endorsing, Christianity." 5
B. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union
The Court applied O'Connor's test in County of Allegheny v. Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union,2"6 citing her concurrence in Lynch." 7 In Alle-
gheny, the Court held that a Christian nativity scene on display in a
county courthouse violated the Establishment Clause,2 °0 but concluded
that a separate display of a Jewish menorah next to a Christmas tree did
not.2o9
The Court reasoned that the Establishment Clause is based upon the
country's religious diversity.210 The Court held that the Establishment
Clause protects that diversity as it exists today, even if the Clause was
originally "understood to protect only the diversity within Christian-
ity." '211 The Court, for the sake of argument, considered Rehnquist's in-
terpretation of the Framers' intent.21 2 They rejected his conclusion,
however.21 3
Thus, Allegheny firmly rejects Rehnquist's nonpreferentialist posi-
tion.2" 4 Although Rehnquist asserted in Jaffree that the Establishment
202. Id. at 691.
203. Id. at 692.
204. Id. at 690.
205. Id. at 694.
206. 492 U.S. 573, 594-97 (1989).
207. Interestingly, Justice O'Connor did not join in Part III.B of the Allegheny opinion.
This Part of the opinion adopted the analytical framework that O'Connor set forth in Lynch:
"The effect of the display depends upon the message that the government's practice communi-
cates: the question is 'what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the display."
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). In-
stead, O'Connor wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment:
"[T]he Establishment Clause 'prohibits government from making adherence to a religion rele-
vant in any way to a person's standing in the political community. The government violates
this prohibition if it endorses or disapproves of religion.'" Id. at 625 (citations omitted).
208. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 602.
209. A majority of the Court reached this result through three separate opinions: 492 U.S.
at 620 (Blackmun, J.); id. at 637 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 667 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
210. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 589.
211. Id. at 590.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Rehnquist's position is described supra Part III.
Clause permits the government to favor religion generally,2" 5 Allegheny
emphasizes that the Establishment Clause guarantees religious liberty
and equality to "'the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Chris-
tian faith such as Islam or Judaism.' "216 Allegheny "squarely... re-
jected the proposition that the Establishment Clause is to be interpreted
in light of any favoritism for Christianity that may have existed among
the Founders of the Republic."21 7 Using O'Connor's Establishment
Clause analysis, the Court held that the Establishment Clause "pre-
clude[s] government from conveying or attempting to convey a message
that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred."21
Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in Justice Kennedy's dissenting opin-
ion.219 Justice Kennedy viewed both the cr6che and the menorah as con-
stitutional.220  He applied Lemon begrudgingly,22 1 and expressed
unequivocal accomodationist sentiment:
Government policies of accomodation, acknowledgment, and sup-
port for religion are an accepted part of our political and cultural
heritage.... [Tihe Establishment Clause permits government some
latitude in recognizing and accomodating the central role religion
plays in our society.... A categorical approach would install fed-
eral courts as jealous guardians of an absolute "wall of separation,"
sending a clear message of disapproval.222
Kennedy would use a "coercion" test to demarcate the border be-
tween constitutional "accomodation" and unconstitutional "establish-
ment" of religion.223 This analysis is derived from a nine-page article
written by Professor McConnell.224 In his article, Professor McConnell
asserts simply that the Framers considered "coercion" to be a necessary
element of an Establishment Clause violation.22 Under Kennedy's for-
mulation, "government may not coerce anyone to support or participate
in any religion or its exercise. 226
Kennedy does not consider "passive and symbolic" governmental
215. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
216. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 590 (quoting Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 52).
217. Id. at 605 n.55.
218. Id. at 593 (quoting Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment))
(emphasis added).
219. Id. at 655-79 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
220. Id. at 667.
221. "I am content for present purposes to remain within the Lemon framework, but do
not wish to be seen as advocating, let alone adopting, that test as our primary guide in this
difficult area... Substantial revision of our Establishment Clause doctrine may be in order
... ." Id at 655-56.
222. Id. at 657 (citations omitted).
223. Id. at 659-60.
224. Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 933 (1986).
225. Id. at 935.
226. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting).
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activity, such as a creche, "coercive." '227 He would judge such "noncoer-
cive" activity by this historical test: "Noncoercive government action
within the realm of flexible accomodation or passive acknowledgment of
existing symbols does not violate the Establishment Clause unless it ben-
efits religion in a way more direct and more substantial than practices
that are accepted in our national heritage."22 8 The Court, however, ex-
plicitly rejected the "no coercion" interpretation of the Establishment
Clause.229
Kennedy criticized O'Connor's "no endorsement" test as "flawed in
its fundamentals and unworkable in practice. 230 In Kennedy's view, the
"no endorsement" test would invalidate traditional religious practices,
such as Christmas caroling.23' He objected that O'Connor's test favors
minority religious views.232 Minority religions, however, are the most
likely to be discriminated against by the majoritarian political process. 233
Thus, they are most in need of judicially-enforced constitutional
protection.
C. Board of Education v. Mergens
Rehnquist indicated in Board of Education v. Mergens234 that he
may be willing to accept O'Connor's "no endorsement" view. In
Mergens, a student proposed to form a Christian club at her public high
school.235 The school refused to officially sanction the club, citing the
Establishment Clause.236 The student then sued the school under the
Equal Access Act. 2 37 The Equal Access Act prohibits public secondary
schools that maintain a "limited open forum" from denying "equal ac-
cess" to student groups on the basis of the "religious, political, philo-
sophical, or other content" of their speech.238
O'Connor wrote the majority opinion, which held that the school
had violated the Equal Access Act.2 39 She also wrote the plurality opin-
227. See id. at 662.
228. Id. at 662-63.
229. Id. at 597-98 n.47. Although Allegheny rejected the "no coercion" analysis, briefs
ified in the Weisman case reassert it. Brief for the Petitioners at 14-44, Weisman, No. 90-1014;
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 19 n.18, Weisman, No.
90-1014.
230. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 669 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting).
231. Id. at 674 n.10.
232. Id. at 676-77.
233. See supra Part IV.C.
234. 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
235. Id. at 2362.
236. Id. at 2363.
237. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1988).
238. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (1988).
239. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2373. O'Connor was joined, in this part of her opinion, by
Rehnquist, White, Blackmun, Scalia, and Kennedy.
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ion, which held that the Equal Access Act did not violate the Establish-
ment Clause.24°
O'Connor applied her "no endorsement" test to the Establishment
Clause claim. In doing so, she distinguished between government en-
dorsement of religion and private endorsement of religion: "[T]here is a
crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which
the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion,
which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect."241 The
Christian club was deemed acceptable because the speech was that of the
students, rather than the school.242 The plurality deferred to a congres-
sional finding that the use of high school facilities for a religious use
would not be perceived by the students as "state sponsorship of
religion."243
Rehnquist joined not only in the majority opinion, which found a
violation of the Equal Access Act, but also in this part of O'Connor's
opinion which applied the "no endorsement" test to the Establishment
Clause claim. It is significant that Rehnquist could have avoided adopt-
ing the "no endorsement" test, without affecting the outcome of
Mergens.244 It appears that Rehnquist may be willing to accept "en-
dorsement" as the standard by which to evaluate government sponsor-
ship of private speech.
VI. Lee v. Weisman
Lee v. Weisman began as "a relatively minor church-state skir-
mish."24 5 A Jewish family sought an injunction to prevent prayers at
their daughter's public school graduation ceremony in Providence,
Rhode Island. 46 The district court held that the graduation prayers vio-
240. Id. at 2370. O'Connor was joined here by Rehnquist, White, and Blackmun.
241. Id. at 2372 (emphasis in original).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Justices Marshall and Brennan also accepted the "no endorsement" test. Id. at 2376-
79 (Marshall, J., with Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). Marshall stated, however,
that the high school "must fully disassociate itself from the Club's religious speech and avoid
appearing to sponsor or endorse the Club's goals." Id. at 2382 (emphasis added).
On the other hand, Justices Kennedy and Scalia rejected the "no endorsement" test. Id.
at 2377 (Kennedy, J., with Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment). The
relevant inquiry for Kennedy is whether the school "imposes pressure" upon students. Ido at
2378.
Rehnquist could have avoided the "no endorsement" test, either by joining in Kennedy's
opinion, or by writing his own. The result in the case would not have been affected.
245. Rob Boston, Bushwacking the First Amendment, CHURCH & STATE, Apr. 1991, at 4.
246. A motion for a temporary restraining order to prevent the prayers was denied. Weis-
man v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68, 69 (D.R.I. 1990). The ceremony in fact went forward, and
included both an invocation and a benediction. The invocation read as follows:
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lated the Establishment Clause,247 and the First Circuit agreed.248 Provi-
dence school officials petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, based
upon conflicting holdings in the circuit courts with respect to which line
of cases governs school graduation prayers.2 49
The Sixth Circuit held, in Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools, 250
that public school graduation prayers are analogous to the legislative and
judicial prayers upheld in Marsh v. Chambers.251 Furthermore, the Sixth
Circuit found that there was less opportunity for indoctrination at gradu-
ation ceremonies than in the classroom for two reasons: first, the public
nature of the ceremonies and the usual presence of parents provided a
buffer from religious coercion; second, because the prayers were not led
by a teacher or school official, they did not implicate the teacher/student
relationship.25 2 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit applied Marsh,253 rather
than Lemon, to the school prayers in Stein. The Stein court ultimately
God of the Free, Hope of the Brave:
For the legacy of America where diversity is celebrated and the rights of minori-
ties are protected, we thank You. May these young men and women grow up to
enrich it.
For the liberty of America, we thank You. May these new graduates grow up to
guard it.
For the political process of America in which all its citizens may participate, for
its court system where all can seek justice we thank You. May those we honor this
morning always turn to it in trust.
For the destiny of America we thank You. May the graduates of Nathan
Bishop Middle School so live that they might help to share it.
May our aspirations for our country and for these young people, who are our
hope for the future, be richly fulfilled.
AMEN
The benediction read:
0 God, we are grateful to You for having endowed us with the capacity for
learning which we have celebrated on this joyous commencement.
Happy families give thanks for seeing their children achieve an important mile-
stone. Send Your blessings upon the teachers and administrators who helped pre-
pare them.
The graduates now need strength and guidance for the future. Help them to
understand that we are not complete with academic knowledge alone. We must each
strive to fulfill what You require of us all: To do justly, to love mercy, to walk
humbly.
We give thanks to You, Lord, for keeping us alive, sustaining us and allowing us
to reach this special, happy occasion.
AMEN
Both are reproduced in Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090, 1098 n.* (1st Cir. 1990) (Campbell, J.,
dissenting).
247. Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68, 72 (D.R.I. 1990).
248. Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990).
249. Under the heading "Reasons for Granting the Writ," the petition states: "This case
starkly presents a conflict in the circuits over the proper application of, and interrelationship
between... Lemon and Marsh." Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit at 6, Lee v. Weisman, No. 90-1014 (U.S. argued Nov. 6, 1991).
250. 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987).
251. Id. at 1409.
252. Id.
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held that the school prayers were unconstitutional under Marsh because
the prayers were Christian, and therefore sectarian.25 4
In Weisman v. Lee,2 " the First Circuit expressly rejected the Stein
court's reasoning, and held that the school graduation prayer violated
the "effect" prong of Lemon.25 6 Judge Bownes' concurrence cited
O'Connor's opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly as controlling authority for
both the "effect" prong and the "entanglement" prong of Lemon.25 7 In
applying the "secular purpose" prong of the.Lemon test, Judge Bownes
cited Wallace v. Jaffree, in addition to Lynch. He distinguished Marsh
(which did not apply Lemon)2 s5 as "inapplicable to school prayer
cases." 259 He also cited Black's broad separationist language in Everson
v. Board of Education.26
Judge Bownes considered Rehnquist's Jaffree dissent, but dismissed
it.26 1 He did so because the historical record of the Framers' intent is
inconclusive, and because conditions have changed since the Constitu-
tion was written.262 Judge Bownes followed Allegheny's holding that the
Establishment Clause now "'guarantee[s] religious liberty and equality
to the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith' " even
if the Establishment Clause was originally understood to protect only the
diversity within Christianity.263
Thus, the First and Sixth Circuits are in direct conflict over the
scope of the Marsh exception to Lemon.216  The school officials in Weis-
man based their petition for certiorari upon this conflict.
2 65
253. Id. Marsh did not apply the Lemon test. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying
text.
254. Id. at 1410.
255. 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990).
256. The majority opinion for the First Circuit simply affirmed "the sound and pellucid
opinion of the district court," without further elaboration. Id. at 1090.
The district court, declining to follow Stein, had held that the prayer violated the "effect"
prong of Lemon. That court held that Marsh created a narrow exception to Lemon, "limited
to the unique situation of legislative prayer." Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68, 74 (D.R.I.
1990).
257. 908 F.2d at 1095 (Bownes, J., concurring).
258. See discussion supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
259. 908 F.2d at 1096 (Bownes, J., concurring).
260. Id at 1097 (Bownes, J., concurring). Everson is discussed supra Part I.A.
261. 908 F.2d at 1093.
262. Id.
263. Id at 1093 (quoting County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S.
573, 590 (1989)).
264. Recall Professor Cord's characterization of Brennan's dissent in Marsh as a "master-
ful display of damage control." See supra note 53. Brennan's "damage control" will be se-
verely tested by the Weisman decision.
265. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit at 6, Weisman, No. 90-1014; see supra note 249.
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The argument in Lee v. Weisman has now advanced far beyond this
narrow disagreement, however. In support of the the Providence school
officials, the Solicitor General filed a brief urging the Court to hear the
case.266 Rather than addressing the Circuits' narrow disagreement, the
Solicitor General criticizes the Lemon test2 67 and the principle of separa-
tion of church and state.268
The Court granted the petition for certiorari, and the Solicitor Gen-
eral filed another brief arguing that the prayers in Weisman are constitu-
tional.2 69 Although the petitioners in Weisman criticize Lemon,270 they
stop short of calling for its overthrow.2 7 1 In contrast, the Solicitor Gen-
eral explicitly asks the Court to overturn Lemon.2 72
Both the Petitioners and the Solicitor General argue for the "no co-
ercion" analysis that was rejected by the Court in Allegheny.273 The
"no coercion" analysis begs the question: Is a nonpreferential establish-
ment, such as the generic prayer in Weisman, coercive? Both the peti-
tioners and the Solicitor General cite Madison's brief comments in the
First Congress in support of a "no coercion" standard.274 However, a
more thorough examination of the evidence indicates that the Framers
viewed nonpreferential establishments as coercive.2 75 Furthermore, the
coercive effect of a nonpreferential establishment is more pronounced to-
day than in the time of the Framers, because the United States is now
more diverse in its religious composition.2 76 "Nonpreferential" establish-
ments of religion, such as the prayers in Weisman, pressure schoolchil-
dren to conform to the majority viewpoint.2 77 "Nonpreferential" aid to
266. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Weisman, No. 90-1014.
267. Id. at 8.
268. Id. at 15 n.17 (arguing that separation of church and state amounts to the establish-
ment of "irreligion").
269. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Weisman, No.
90-1014.
270. Brief for the Petitioners at 9-13, Weisman, No. 90-1014.
271. Instead, the petitioners argue that the prayers would survive scrutiny under Lemon.
Id. at 44-49.
272. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6, 20, Weis-
man, No. 90-1014.
273. Brief for the Petitioners at 14-44, Weisman, No. 90-1014; Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 19 n.18, Weisman, No. 90-1014.
274. Brief for the Petitioners at 24, Weisman, No. 90-1014; Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 17-18, Weisman, No. 90-1014.
275. See supra Part IV.B; see also Respondent's Brief at 36-37, Weisman, No. 90-1014. A
review of history shows that "Americans of the founding generation actually debated and
voted on the question whether government could endorse religion if it did so noncoercively.
The answer was no." Respondent's Brief at 37, Weisman, No. 90-1014.
276. See supra Part IV.A.
277. Respondent's Brief at 44-47, Weisman, No. 90-1014. Even Professor McConnell,
who propounded the "no coercion" argument, agrees that school prayers impose "'indirect
coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing... religion .... '"
McConnell, supra note 224, at 935 (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962)).
religion thereby discriminates against minority religions and
nonbelievers.2
The respondent in Weisman applies O'Connor's "no endorsement"
analysis to the case.279 He argues that the school prayers entangle gov-
ernment with religion,2"' and that they have both the purpose and effect
of endorsing religion.281 Thus, the prayers in Weisman would not sur-
vive O'Connor's "no endorsement" analysis.
Conclusion
Chief Justice Rehnquist has historically been unreceptive toward
O'Connor's "no endorsement" interpretation of the Establishment
Clause. Instead, Rehnquist has favored his "no preference" construc-
tion, which incorporates an accomodationist stance. However, he has
never convinced a majority of the Court to apply his "no preference"
test.
In Board of Education v. Mergens,282 Rehnquist joined an opinion
which applied O'Connor's "no endorsement" analysis. O'Connor's posi-
tion on the Establishment Clause presents a viable compromise between
the accomodationist and separationist camps. From the history that is
available, her view appears to be more faithful to the "original intent" of
the Framers of the First Amendment, than is the "no preference" view.
O'Connor's view also protects the religious liberty of minority religions,
and the nonreligious, while Rehnquist's "no preference" test does not.
The Court has now been asked either to disallow a "nonpreferen-
tial" establishment by applying O'Connor's "no endorsement" test, or to
allow the establishment by adopting a "no coercion" test.283 If Rehn-
quist forsakes his "nonpreferentialist" view in favor of O'Connor's "no
endorsement" test, he will be acting in accordance with the judicial phi-
losophy that he told the members of the Senate Judiciary Committee
they should look for in a nominee to the Supreme Court.284
278. See supra Part IV.C.
279. Respondent's Brief at 22, Weisman, No. 90-1014.
280. Id. at 31-32.
281. Id. at 24-30.
282. 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2370-73 (1990).
283. Compare Brief for the Petitioners at 14-44, Weisman, No. 90-1014 with Respondent's
Brief at 24-32, 36-37, Weisman, No. 90-1014.
284. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
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